The Turkish local elections on 30 March 2014 have been a major victory for
the ruling AK-Party which is based on Islamic values. It is been said that
these elections were a big test for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who
faces serious allegations of corruption. The voting results shows that Turkish
citizens still endorse their Prime Minister: his AK-Party won with 44% of the
votes which represents a 6% decrease compared to the general elections in 2011.
In total they have won 51 out of 81 states. The second winner is the
Kurdish BDP who has won the most states in their home area: South East Turkey.
It was an election containing all the elements of a true thriller: riots
and election violence which resulted in the killing of 8 people, dispute over the
capital Ankara which the AKP booked a narrowly victory, three female candidates
made history by becoming the first female major of the countries metropolitan
cities and one of them in Diyarbakir: the largest city in South East Turkey
where Kurdish people are the big majority of the region (Hurriyet, 2014[1];
Anadolu Agency, 2014)[2].
The campaign between the four big parties can be described as harsh. Especially
between the AK-Party and their main challenger the Republican’s People’s Party,
the CHP of Chairman Kemal Kiliçdaroglu.
The third party, the Nationalists People’s Party, MHP, and the Kurdish
Democratic and Peace Party, BDP, were also conducting a hard campaign against Erdogan’s AK-Party and vice versa. The
opposition parties were all accusing the AK-Party of corruption with hard
language by calling him a ‘thieve’. Some of the accusations were based on recordings
of several conversations between top AKP members which even included the Prime
Minister, and led to the resignation of three Ministers on December 17th,
2013.
One of the recorded conversations depict Erdogan instructing his son to
hide millions of dollars cash which is denied by the Prime
Minister who said that it was fabricated (Letsch, 2014)[3]
Another leaked conversation depicts the deputy chief of staff, the intelligent
chief, the Secretary and undersecretary of Foreign Affairs conversing on a war
against Syria under a false flag operation. This last tape was just released a
few days before the elections and thereafter have YouTube and twitter been
blocked under the name of national security (Moore, 2014)[4].
It is widely assumed that the movement of the Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen,
who lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and who is involved in a power
struggle with Erdogan, released these conversations. Gülen is an influential Ieader
whose Hizmet movement (Turkish for Service) has hundreds of schools in more
than a 100 countries scattered over Europe, Central Asia, Africa and the
USA. Education is the trademark of this
organization. However it is also believed that Hizmet holds influential key
positions at the police, the judiciary, and the intelligence services in Turkey.
The accusations of corruption and the leaking of phone conversations
was, according to Erdogan, a conspiracy of foreign and internal powers, hereby
referring directly to Gülen and indirectly to the USA and Israel[5].
As the voting results shows; this argument has enjoyed significant credibility among
the Turkish people. It was an enormous disappointment for the CHP since they
could not profit from all the scandals of the AK-Party. The CHP aimed to
receive 30% of the votes but just had 28% and have won only 13 states, which is
a slightly increasing compared to the last elections.
The BDP contains 7% of the votes if there independent
candidates (for vote technical reasons)
will be counted as BDP (Source Anadolu
Agency).
The second winner
The second winner of the elections was the Kurdish BDP that is strongly
connected to the PKK, the guerilla movement of jailed leader Abdullah Öçalan
who was captured in 1999 by Turkish authorities after being the most wanted man
for since his PKK started a guerilla war 1984 for an independent Kurdistan.
The BDP participates in the elections since the eighties although many
times under different names since the party was banned several times under accusations
of ‘terrorist activities’. Up until the uprising of the AKP in 2002 they had
won the elections in the South East region by huge majorities. Nowadays
however, the BDP are sharing the votes with the AKP, who appeal to the Islamic
identity of the Kurdish people who are in general quite religious, while the
BDP appeals to the ethnicity of the Kurdish people.
(Tayiz, 2014[6]).
Nevertheless, the 2014 election can be seen as a victory for the BDP
since they have won almost all the states in the South East region including
two take-overs from the AKP: Mardin, and Bitlis. They also maintained
their leading position in Diyarbakir, a symbolic city that was once considered as
the capital of a future independent Kurdistan, and Van the other major city of
the region. This result awards the party a stronger position in the
negotiations with the AK-Party regarding the Kurdish issue, since they can now
portray themselves as the representatives of the majority of the Kurdish
people. Moreover this result may strengthens their demand of ‘democratic
autonomy’ of the South East region. On the other hand can the AKP argue that
the BDP is not the only representative of citizens with a Kurdish background
since they are the second party in the region.
It must be acknowledged that the position of the Kurds under the AK-Party
governance has been improved through the implementing of some serious reforms: the
ban on Kurdish languages and identity was lifted, the celebrations of Kurdish
holidays are allowed, and some economic investments are made in the relatively
poor region. Erdogan claimed numerous times that his administration made an end
to the “ignorance politics” or the “assimilation policy” of his predecessors,
while the BDP attributes this to the result of their struggle (http://www.dw.de/turkish-pm-unveils-reforms-to-increase-rights-of-kurdish-minority/a-17128423) .
Nevertheless it was in late 2012 that Erdogan has said that the negation
process with Imrali continues,
referring to the island where Öçalan is serving his life sentence. It can be
seen as a great improvement for him personal as for his PKK that Turkey are
acknowledging them as interlocutors of the conflict. The state once portrayed
Öcalan as the greatest enemy of the state through a tremendous smear campaign in
the media for the past 25 years. A few months after the announcement gave
Öcalan a written statement that was read by BDP MP’s on Newroz, the Kurdish New
Year, in which Öcalan called for a cease-fire, a withdrawal from Turkish
territory, and an end to the armed struggle (Letsch, 2013)[7]. A
well-equipped modern army that fought a tuff guerilla war against the PKK with
human right violations on both sides and resulting of 40.000 dead’s came, at
least for temporarily, to an end (Sinclair-Webb)[8].
This cease-fire has been in place for a year and can also be considered
a huge improvement
In his last statement, which was read on the 21st March of 2014, on the Newroz holiday, the
jailed leader praised dialogue and that both parties have shown goodwill while
concurrently criticizing the government for delaying the peace process. At the
same time he called to choose the path of ‘democracy’ and warned against certain
elements that threatens the negotiation process (FiratNews, 2014)[9] .
The BDP has repeatedly stated that the key to the resolution lays in
Imrali and are asking for the release of Öçalan as their condition to bring
peace. It would be a real spectacle if this condition were to be met, which
will lead to the leader being perceived by his followers as their ‘Kurdish
Nelson Mandela’. Furthermore the Kurds are no longer demanding an independent
state, but a system of federalism with autonomous regions (Hurriyet Daily News,
2012)[10]
celebration of Newroz day in Diyarbakir (2014)
Support for the democratic opening is a condition of success
There are indeed some actors within the country that are firmly against
this peace process, also referred as solution
process or democratic opening
(demokrat açilim) in Turkey.
Perhaps the assassination of three female members of the PKK in Paris in
January 2013 can be regarded as the greatest threat to the peace process until
now. One of the assassinated female was Sakine Çansiz, the co-founder of the
PKK and it occurred at the start of the talks between Öçalan and the government.
New suspicions, although they are only that, points the involvement of the
Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) (Gezer, Ö. et al).[11]
In addition there is also the missing support of certain groups and
political parties.
If we take a look at the political parties, there are two parties that
can play a significant role in this process, namely the MHP and CHP. The former
is firmly opposed to the demokrat açilim
arguing that not negotiations but fighting against terrorists will help to end
terrorism. This party was also disappointed by the elections (Çitlak, 2013)[12].
Coincidentally the leader of the nationalist party Devlet Bahçeli was
part of a coalition in 1999, when Öçalan was captured and the coalition parties
decided not to execute him while the nationalists were always the hardest
opponents of the PKK, an argument that is often used by Erdogan to attack the
leader.
The position of CHP in regard to the democratic
opening can be described as questionable. The founder of the Turkish
republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the party which was the only allowed
party until 1950 when his successor Ismet Inönü made a transformation to a
multiple party system. The main pillar of CHP is to defend a secular Turkey of
Atatürk wherefor a strict distinction between religion and politics is required.
They had strong connections with the army. In addition, the CHP includes
nationalistic elements (ulusalçilar) that
are deeply rooted in the party. On the other hand it can be described as
revolutionary for the party, to have, for the first time a chairman who has a
Kurdish (and Alevite) background. Kiliçdaroglu is from Tunceli (or Dersim which
is the original name that many Kurds prefer as the official name), a symbolic
rebellious state since the Ottoman Empire. Earlier Kiliçdaroglu supported to
give Kurdish lessons on private schools and said that the ulusalçilar in his party want to hinder the peace process (UlusalKanal,
2012)[13].
That Turkey has made some serious steps forward in the democratic opening symbolized the
apologies of the Prime Minister for the massacre of Dersim during 1936 – 1939
when Atatürk was the president of the new established republic. Exact numbers regarding
the number of people killed during the uprising are unknown but it is estimated
to be around 13000 people who died by aerial bombings and poison gas. Erdogan
accused the CHP here for, since they were in office at the time and furthermore
asked Kiliçdaroglu to apologize on behalf of his party which he did not (BBC,
2011)[14].
But the CHP supported the secret talks between the PKK and MIT in Oslo
during 2009 - 2010 which were leaked to the press.
Kiliçdaroglu said that if these negotiations lead to the disarmament of
the PKK, they should continue but not secretly (Radikal, 2012)[15].
This support can be considered as surprising since the Turkish political
climate is very harsh and the CHP is conducting a harsh oppositional role
against the AKP and have numerous times criticized the democratic opening. It is important for the AKP to have support in
this process despite their majority in the parliament and their massive
supporters among the citizens: this is not enough to reach a definitive peace
agreement.
In order to resolve such a complex conflict which has a history of three
decades of a guerrilla war, it is important to have a broad support through the
society including civil society organizations, famous artists, scientists, and
journalists among others.
In the article Building Peace In
Sri Lanka author Camilla Orjuela states that civil society actors in
peacebuilding are representatives and in touch with ‘the people’. In contrast
to the parties of the armed conflicts (guerilla movement or the state) that
often claim to represent ‘the people’ to different degrees but this claim
depends whether the parties can stay in power and sustain their legitimacy. “Peace
cannot only be agreed on the top level, civilian protest or non-cooperation can
become decisive for the continuation of both war and peace” (Orjuela, 2003:
197).
The corruption barely affected the elections: the AKP won by an
overwhelming majority. The CHP and MHP have had disappointing results from the
elections while the Kurdish BDP can be seen as the second winner by winning the
most states in South East Turkey while remaining the largest in the region.
This will probably strengthen their position in the negotiations with the Turkish
state, especially regarding the democrat
açilim. As we have seen; to reach a
definitive peace agreement the AKP needs a broad support, not only from the
political field but throughout the whole society. To win support at the
political level the position of the second party of the country, the CHP, can
be crucial. Their position seems to be unclear since they have currently been
criticizing the democrat açilim while
the chairman also expressed his support to the negotiations in Oslo with a few
conditions included.
The role of CSO’s can be decisive in securing the support within the
society since they are very close to citizens and represent them at the lowest
level. CSO’s are capable to transform the public opinion that is mainly very
hostile to the PKK.
If it comes to a decisive peace agreement it would be one of the few
ethnic conflicts that ended by peace and
can serve as an example for the Middle East.
[1] Hurriyet, 2014, ‘Turkey
elects three female metropolitan majors in a first, 1 April, visited on 6 April
2014, <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-elects-three-female-metropolitan-mayors-in-a-first.aspx?PageID=238&NID=64324&NewsCatID=338>
[2] Anadolu Agency, 2014, ‘Turkey
election board rejects main opposition recount request’, 4 April, visited on 6
April 2014, <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/309896--turkey-election-board-rejects-main-opposition-recount-request>
[3] Letsch, C, 2014, ‘Leaked tapes
prompt calls for Turkish PM to resign’, Guardian,
25 February, visited on 6 April 2014
[4] Moore, J. 2014. ‘Turkey YouTube
Ban: Full Transcript of Leaked Syria ‘War’Conversation Between Erdogan
Officials’ International Business Times¸27
March, visited on 7 April 2014
[5] BBC, 2014, ‘Q&A: Turkish PM
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s troubles, 22 March 2014, visited on 8 April 2014
[6] Tayiz, K. 2014, ‘Kurdish Vote Split
Between Two Parties’ Daily Sabah, 19
March 2014, visited on 8 April 2014
[7] Letsch, C. 2013, ‘Kurdish Leader
Abdullah Ocalan Declares Ceasefire with Turkey, 21 March, visited on 7 April
2014 < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/21/pkk-leader-ocalan-declares-ceasefire>.
[8] Sinclair-Webb, E. 2011, ‘Turkey’s
human rights challenges’ Human Rights
Watch, 19 December, visited on 8 April 2014 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/19/turkeys-human-rights-challenges >
[9] FiratNews, 2014, ‘Öcalan: The Test
Ended, it’s Time for Negotiation – FULL TEXT, 21 March, visited on 8 April
2014: < http://en.firatnews.com/news/news/ocalan-the-test-ended-it-s-time-for-negotiation-full-text.htm>
[10] Hurriyet Daily News, 2012, ‘Kurds
OK with Federalism for Now: BDP, 17 March, visited on 8 April 20114 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurds-ok-with-federalism-for-now-bdp.aspx?pageID=238&nID=30385&NewsCatID=338 >
[11] Gezer, Ö. Diel, J. And Schmid F,
2012 ‘Paris Investigation: Tensions Grow over Murder of Kurdish Activists’, 12
February, visited on 7 April 2014 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/suspicions-grow-of-turkish-involvement-in-murder-of-pkk-activists-a-952734.html >
[12] Çitlak, A. 2013, ‘MHP Leader
Suggests Fight against Terrorism not Negotiations’ Todays Zaman, 17 March, visited on 6 April 2014 < http://www.todayszaman.com/news-309989-mhp-leader-suggests-fight-against-terrorism-not-negotiation.html >
[13] UlusalKanal, 2012, ‘Kiliçdaroglu:
Parti Içindeki Ulusalci Kanat Çözüme Engel’, 17 November, visited on 8 April
2014: < http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglu-parti-icindeki-ulusalci-kanat-cozume-engel-h7031.html >
[14] BBC, 2011, ‘Turkey PM Erdogan
apologises for 1930s Kurdish Killings’, 23 November, visited on 6 April 2014
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15857429>
[15] Radikal, 2012, ‘Kiliçdaroglu:
PKK Silah Birakacaksa Oslo görüsmeleri sürmeli’, 20 September, visited on 6
April 2014 < http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/kilicdaroglu_pkk_silah_birakacaksa_oslo_gorusmeleri_surmeli-1100982 >
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